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Abstract. According to Shapley’s game-theoretical result, there exists
a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms
on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The origi-
nal setting requires symmetry with respect to arbitrary permutations of
players. We analyze the consequences of weakening the symmetry axioms
and study quasi-values that are symmetric with respect to permutations
from a group G ≤ Sn. We classify all the permutation groups G that
are large enough to assure a unique G-symmetric quasi-value, as well as
the structure and dimension of the space of all such quasi-values for a
general permutation group G.
We show how to construct G-symmetric quasi-values algorithmically by
averaging certain basic quasi-values (marginal operators).
1 Introduction
A cooperative game is an assignment of a real number to each subset of a given
set of playersΩ. This illustrates an economic situation where a coalition profit de-
pends on the involved players in a generally non-aditive way. Several approaches
deal with the question of redistributing the generated profit to the individual
players in a stable or in a “fair” way. The mathematical theory of cooperative
games was developed in forties by Neumann and Morgenstern [17]. Values of
games provide a tool for evaluating the contributions of the individual players
such that certain natural axioms are satisfied. The most famous value is the
Shapley value introduced in 1953 [22] that exists and is unique for all finite sets
of players.
There exist many axiomatic systems on game values such that the Shapley
value is their only solution: the original Shapley’s axiomatics [22], Neyman’s [18],
Young’s [24], van den Brink’s [3] and Kar’s axiomatics [15]. One of its important
characteristics is the symmetry with respect to any permutation of players. This
means, roughly speaking, that the value of a player is calculated only from his
contributions to various coalitions and not from his identity. One may consider
this to represent the equity of players. However, this is probably not a realistic
assumption in many real-world situations where personal friendships and link-
age play a major role. Some examples of values with restricted symmetry were
studied, such as the Owen value [20] or the weighted Shapley value in [14], and
the formal concept of quasi-value, where one completely relaxes any symmetry
requirement, was introduced by Gilboa and Monderer in 1991 [10]. It is known
that for a particular player set, there exist infinitely many quasi-values.
In this work, we analyze one particular way of weakening the symmetry ax-
iom. We suppose that a group G of permutations of Ω is given and define a G-
symmetric quasi-value to be any quasi-value symmetric wrt. all permutations in
G. Informally, the equity of players is restricted to a group of permutations of
players, not necessarily to all permutations. The group expresses the measure of
symmetry. If G is the full symmetry group, then the only G-symmetric quasi-
value is the Shapley value; if G is the trivial group, then it carries no symmetry
requirement and each quasi-value is G-symmetric. Our contribution is the classi-
fication of all permutation groups G of finite sets of players for which there exists
a unique G-symmetric quasi-value. It turns out that while in the infinite setting
for non-atomic games one may reduce the group of symmetries in a number of
ways [16,19], in the finite setting, only few subgroups of the full permutation
group assure uniqueness. Even if the group G acts transitively on Ω (i.e. for any
two players a, b, there exists a permutation π ∈ G such that π(a) = b), there
may still exist many G-symmetric quasi-values different from the Shapley value.
We also calculate the dimension of the space of all G-symmetric quasi-values for
a general permutation group G.
In the second section, we give the formal definition of G-symmetric quasi-
value and some necessary definitions from group theory, including our original
definition of a supertransitive group action. In the third section, we show that
the space of all G-symmetric quasi-values is an affine subspace of the vector
space of all values, and derive a formula for its dimension. We further classify all
permutation groupsG such that there exists a uniqueG-symmetric quasivalue. In
the fourth section, we give some examples of G-symmetric quasi-values and show
how more examples can be constructed by averaging the marginal operators. The
last section (Appendix) contains the proof of an auxiliary statement from group
theory that we use in the proof of Theorem 2. We postpone this technical issue
to the end in order to keep the rest of the text fluent.
2 Definitions and notation
2.1 Cooperative games
Let Ω be a set of players. In this paper, we always suppose that Ω is finite.
Definition 1. A cooperative game is a function v : 2Ω → R such that v(∅) = 0.
A cooperative game is additive, if for all T,R ∈ 2Ω, R∩T = ∅ implies v(R∪T ) =
v(R) + v(T ). We denote by Γ the set of all cooperative games and Γ1 the set of
all additive cooperative games. A game value is an operator ϕ : Γ → Γ1. For a
game value ϕ and i ∈ Ω, we define ϕi(v) := ϕ(v)({i}).
For each game v, ϕ(v) is uniquelly determined by the numbers ϕi(v). Shapley
theorem [22] proves the existence and uniqueness of a game value ϕ assuming it
satisfies the following four axioms:
1. Linearity: ϕ(αv + βw) = αϕ(v) + βϕ(w) for all v, w ∈ Γ and α, β ∈ R.
2. Null-player property: if i ∈ Ω is a “null-player” in a game v, i.e. v(R∪{i}) =
v(R) for each R ⊆ Ω, then ϕi(v) = 0.
3. Efficiency:
∑
i ϕi(v) = v(Ω) for all games v.
4. Symmetry (sometimes called anonymity): ϕ(π · v) = π · ϕ(v) for every per-
mutation π of Ω, where the game π · v is defined by (π · v)(R) := v(π−1(R))
for any R ⊆ Ω.
The value defined by these axioms is called Shapley value. Axioms 1-4 are inde-
pendent. Gilles [11] and Schmeidler [5] give examples of values satisfying any 3
of them and not the 4th.
Any game value satisfying axioms 1, 2 and 3 is called a quasi-value. In the
original economic interpretation, the fourth axiom (Symmetry) is an expression
of equity of all the participating players. It can be formulated in a more elegant
way by the commutativity of the following diagram.
Γ
ϕ
−−−−→ Γ1ypi ypi
Γ
ϕ
−−−−→ Γ1
(1)
Axiom 4 requires that it commutes for each permutation of players π.
The following definition introduces the main object of our study.
Definition 2. Let G by a group of permutations of Ω. A G-symmetric quasi-
value is a game value that satisfies axioms 1, 2, 3 and such that ϕ(π ·v) = π ·ϕ(v)
for every permutation π ∈ G. In other words, diagram (1) commutes for all
π ∈ G.
Throughout this work, we will need the following basis of the space of coop-
erative games, introduced in Shapley’s original paper [22].
Definition 3. The unanimity basis is the basis {uR}∅6=R⊆Ω of the vector space
of all cooperative games over the set Ω, defined by uR(S) = 1 if R ⊆ S and 0
otherwise.
2.2 Group theory
We say that a group G acts on the set X , if G is a subgroup of the group SX
of permutations of X . Any set G · x is called an orbit, or a G-orbit of x. The
set of all G-orbits is denoted by X/G. The action of G on X is transitive, if for
each x, y ∈ X , there exists a g ∈ G such that g ·x = y. The stabilizer of a subset
A ⊆ X is the subgroup GA of all elements g ∈ G such that g · A ⊆ A. For a
subgroup H of G, g ·H denotes a left and H ·g a right coset of H and any group
H ′ = g−1Hg is conjugate to H .
We introduce here a definition that will help us to describe a property of
permutation groups we will need later.
Definition 4. Let G be a group acting on a set X. We say that the action is
a supertransitive action, if the stabilizer GA of any subset A ⊆ X acts transi-
tively on A. A permutation group G ⊆ Sn is supertransitive, if the stabilizer GA
acts transitively on each A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
For any n, Sn−1 may be embedded into Sn as a set of permutations preserving
one element. However, for n = 6, there exists an embedding of S5 into S6 different
from the standard one. This embedding S5 →֒ S6 may be realized as the action of
the projective linear group PGL(2, 5) on the projective line over Z5. The reader
may find the details in the literature [7, p. 60-61], [4]. We will call this embedding
an exotic embedding. It is well known that such a nonstandard embedding is
only one up to conjugation by an element of S6. In this paper, we only need the
property that the image of the exotic embedding is a supertransitive subgroup
of S6. This is proved in the appendix.
3 Dimension of G-symmetric quasi-values
If a quasi-value is symmetric with respect to a set of permutations, it is also
symmetric with respect to any permutation they generate in SΩ, hence the set
of all symmetries of a quasi-value is always a group. For a finite set Ω and a
group G ⊆ SΩ of permutations, we denote by AG the set of all G-symmetric
quasi-values.
We will represent AG as a space of matrices. Each game value ϕ can be
represented as a map from Γ to RΩ by the natural identification Γ1 ≃ RΩ.
Choosing the unanimity basis on Γ (Def. 3) and the canonical basis (ei)i∈Ω on
RΩ, we may represent linear game values as matrices of the size |Ω|× (2|Ω|− 1).
The null player property applied to the unanimity basis implies ϕ(uR)({i}) = 0
for each i /∈ R, because such player i doesn’t contribute to any coalition in
the game uR. As a consequence, a matrix A with elements (aiR)i∈Ω, ∅6=R⊆Ω
corresponds to a linear game value satisfying the null-player-property iff aiR =
0 for all pairs (i, R) such that i /∈ R. Further, the game value satisfies the
efficiency axiom iff for any nonempty R ⊆ Ω, ϕ(uR)(Ω) = 1, which translates
to a constraint on matrix coefficients
∑
i∈R aiR = 1 for each ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω. The
G-symmetry of a game value requires ϕ(g · v) = g · (ϕ(v)) for any game v and
permutation g ∈ G, the action of G on Γ defined by (g · v)(R) = v(g−1R).
An element uR from the unanimity basis satisfies (g · uR)(S) = uR(g−1(S)) =
ugR(S), so the unanimity basis is invariant with respect to the group action and
g · uR = ugR. The symmetry axiom is equivalent to
((g · ϕ)(uR))({i}) = (ϕ(ugR))({i}),
for all i ∈ Ω and ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω. The left-hand side is equal to ϕ(uR)({g−1i}).
So, in the matrix representation of ϕ, the symmetry axiom translates to the
condition a(g−1i)R = ai (gR), or simply aiR = a(gi) (gR) for all i ∈ Ω, ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω
and g ∈ G.
Summarizing this, we have the following.
Lemma 1. Choosing the unanimity basis of Γ and the canonical basis of RΩ ≃
Γ1, AG may be identified with a set of matrices A = (aiR) with elements satis-
fying the following equations:
– aiR = 0 if i /∈ R,
– The sum of elements in each column is 1,
– Matrix elements aiR are constant on the orbits of the G-action g · (i, R) =
(gi, gR).
All these conditions are linear equations for matrix elements aiR and they are
all satisfied by the Shapley value. So, AG is a nonempty affine space.
Theorem 1. Let X = {(i, R); i ∈ R ⊆ Ω}, χ = {R; ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω} and let
G ⊆ SG be a group of permutations acting on sets X and χ, extending naturally
its action on Ω. Then the dimension of AG is |X/G| − |χ/G|. Explicitly it can
also be expressed as
dim AG = (
dZG
dx1
− ZG)|(2,2...2) + 1 (2)
where ZG is the cycle index of the group G
ZG(x1...xn) =
1
|G|
∑
pi∈G
x
j1(pi)
1 · · ·x
jn(pi)
n , (3)
jk(π) denotes the number of cycles of length k in the permutation π [8, p. 85].
Proof. We will identify elements of AG with matrices as described in Lemma 1.
Let p : X → χ be the map (i, R) → R. For any x = (i, R) ∈ X and g ∈ G,
p(gx) = g(p(x)). For ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω, the stabilizer GR acts on R and R splits into kR
orbits {R1, . . . , RkR} with respect to this action. If R
′ = gR, then the stabilizer
of R′ is gGRg
−1 and g maps each GR-orbit Ri ⊆ R bijectively onto a GR′ -orbit
R′i ⊆ R
′. So, kR = kR′ and |Ri| = |R′i| for i = 1, . . . , kR. For m ∈ χ/G, we define
km := kR for any R ∈ m and lmi = |Ri| for i = 1, . . . , km. These numbers are
independent on the choice of R.
We will say that m ∈ χ/G contains an orbit Gx ∈ X/G, if p(x) ∈ m.
Each m ∈ χ/G contains km orbits {o1, . . . , okm} ⊆ X/G and we may choose
real numbers cmi such that
∑km
i=1 cmilmi = 1 with km − 1 degrees of freedom.
Choosing such numbers cmi for all m ∈ χ/G gives∑
m∈χ/G
(km − 1) =
∑
m∈M
km − |χ/G| = |X/G| − |χ/G|
degrees of freedom. Any such choice of cmi defines a matrix of game value
aiR =
{
cmi if i ∈ Ri ⊆ R ∈ m
0 if i /∈ R
These are exactly matrices A constant on the orbits of X satisfying
∑
i aiR = 1
for all R and aiR = 0 for all i /∈ R. The number of degrees of freedom for the
choice of cmi is equal to the dimension of AG. This proves the first part.
Burnside lemma [21, p. 58] enables to express the number of orbits of a group
action in an explicit way. If a finite group H acts on a finite set Y , then
|Y/H | =
1
|H |
∑
h∈H
|{y ∈ Y |h(y) = y}|. (4)
A permutation π ∈ G fixes those sets R ⊆ Ω that don’t split any cycle of π.
There exists 2# cycles(pi) such sets, 2# cycles(pi) − 1 of them nonempty. So,
|χ/G| =
( 1
|G|
∑
pi∈G
2# cycles(pi)
)
− 1.
Elements of X fixed by π are pairs (i, R) such that i ∈ R, π(i) = i and π(R) = R.
There exists # fixedpoints(π)∗2# cycles(pi)−1 such pairs. We derived the following
equation:
dimAG =
1
|G|
(∑
pi∈G
(#fixedpoints(π) ∗ 2#cycles(pi)−1)−
∑
pi∈G
2#cycles(pi)
)
+ 1.
The statement of the theorem follows from this by a direct computation. 
The cycle index ZG is known in a more explicit form than (3) for many subgroups
of Sn and it has also been generalized and computed for finite classical groups [9].
Further, we will show for which groups G the dimension of AG is zero, i.e.
for which G the only G-symmetric quasi-value is the Shapley value. In Section
2.2, we defined a group G ⊆ SΩ to be supertransitive, if the stabilizer GR acts
transitively on R for each subset R ⊆ Ω. In other words, if for each R and
each i, j ∈ R, there exists a g ∈ G such that g(R) = R and g · i = j. We will
show that this condition is equivalent to the existence of a unique G-symmetric
quasi-value.
Theorem 2. Let Ω be finite and G ≤ SΩ. There exists a unique G-symmetric
quasi-value if and only if G acts supertransitively on Ω. Equivalently, this is if
and only one of the following conditions is satisfied:
– G = SΩ, the full symmetric group
– |Ω| > 3 and G = AΩ, the alternating group
– |Ω| = 6 and G is the image of an exotic embedding S5 →֒ S6 (see Sec-
tion 2.2).
Proof. We will work with the matrix representation ofAG, described in Lemma 1.
Let (aiR) be a matrix representing a value in AG.
If the action of G on Ω is supertransitive, then for each ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω, all
elements {(i, R); i ∈ R} lie on the same G-orbit, so all the corresponding matrix
elements aiR are equal. The null-player property implies that aiR = 0 for i /∈ R
and together with the efficiency condition we obtain that for each i ∈ R, aiR =
1/|R|. This implies uniqueness.
If the action of G on Ω is not supertransitive, then there exists a nonempty
subset R˜ ⊆ Ω such that the stabilizer GR˜ has not a transitive action on R˜. So,
R˜ contains at least two GR˜-orbits. We may define the matrix aiR as follows.
In the matrix column corresponding to R˜ we choose aiR˜ = 0 if i /∈ R˜ and the
other elements ajR˜ arbitrary, constant on GR˜-orbits and such that
∑
j ajR˜ = 1.
For all R′ on the G-orbit of R, we define the coefficients aiR′ in a unique way
so that they are constant on the G-orbits and the remaining matrix elements
may be equal to elements of the original Shapley matrix. In this way, we may
construct an infinite number of different G-symmetric quasi-values which proves
that dimAG ≥ 1.
For the classification part, it remains to prove that the groups listed in the
theorem are exactly the groups acting supertransitively on {1, . . . , n}. The proof
of this is technical and we postpone it to the Appendix (Chapter 5). 
4 Consequences
4.1 Examples
First we give some examples of groups and G-symmetric quasi-values. In all
these examples, we assume that the player set Ω consists of n players.
Example 1. Let G1 = {id} be the trivial group. In this case, any quasi-value is
G1-symmetric. Consider a selector γ : 2
Ω → Ω with γ(R) ∈ R for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ Ω.
Now we define the value ϕ as
ϕi(v) =
∑
i=γ(R)
∆v(R) (5)
where ∆v(R) ∈ R is a Harsanyi dividend of the coalition R ⊆ Ω defined by
∆v(R) =
∑
T⊆R(−1)
|R|−|T |v(T ). It was shown in [6] that such values satisfy the
axioms for quasi-values. 3 The cycle index of the trivial group is Z(x1) = x
n
1 and
substituting into (2) yields dimAG1 = n2
n−1 − 2n + 1. However, the number of
selectors γ : 2Ω → Ω is much larger, so many of the quasi-values defined by (5)
are affine dependent.4
Example 2. (“Caste system”) The set Ω is split into k nonempty disjoint
subsets (“castes”) Ω1, . . . , Ωk and G2 is chosen so that it guarantees equity
within each Ωi. Formally, G2 = {π ∈ SΩ | ∀i π(Ωi) = Ωi}.
Some examples of G2-symmetric quasivalues have been described in the lit-
erature. The Owen value, defined in [20], can be obtained as the expected value
3 In the matrix representation, such values correspond to matrices ai R = δiγ(R).
4 For n ≥ 4, dimAG1 is strictly smaller than n! − 1 which implies that the set of
marginal operators (defined in Section 4.2) is also affine dependent.
of marginal operators (see Section 4.2), if we first randomely choose an order of
the castes and then the order of the players within each caste. Another related
concept is the weighted Shapley value, studied by Kalai and Samet in [14]. Here
an order of the castes is given and within each caste, the profit is diveded among
players proportional to their weights. In the case of equal weights of all players,
the weighted Shapley value is symmetric with respect to all G2-permutations.
The cycle index is ZG2 =
∏k
r=1 ZSΩr . We know from the proof of Theorem 2
that |χ/G| = 1|G|
∑
g 2
#cycles(g) for each set χ with a G-action. In particular, for
G = Sn, |2Ω/G| = n + 1, because Sn-orbits of 2Ω are Os = {R ⊆ Ω | |R| = s}
for s = 0, 1, . . . , n. This enables as to calculate
ZSn |(2,...,2) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
2j1(pi)+...+jn(pi) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
2#cycles(pi) = |2Ω/Sn| = n+ 1.
If G = Sn, then the Shapley value is the only game value, so it follows from
Theorem 2 that (
dZSn
dx1
− ZSn)|(2,...,2) + 1 = 0 and
dZSn
dx1
|(2,...,2) = n. So, for
G2 =
∏k
r=1 SΩr
dZG2
dx1
|(2,2...2) =
( k∑
r=1
dZSΩr
dx1
∏
s6=r
ZSΩs
)
|(2,2...2) =
k∑
r=1
|Ωr|
∏
s6=r
(1 + |Ωs|)
and
dimAG2 = (
k∑
r=1
|Ωr|
1 + |Ωr|
− 1)
k∏
r=1
(1 + |Ωr|) + 1.
For the case of two castes k = 2 this simplifies to |Ω1| × |Ω2|.
Example 3. (Cyclic group) This example illustrates that transitive group action
does not imply a unique G-symmetric quasi-value. If G3 is the cyclic group
Cn ⊆ Sn, the cycle index is ZCn =
1
n
∑
f |n φ(f)x
n/f
f , where φ(f) is the Euler
totient function φ(f) = pk1−11 (p1 − 1) . . . p
kr−1
r (pr − 1), where f = p
k1
1 . . . p
kr
r
is the prime number decomposition.[8, p. 86]. Substituting into the formula in
Theorem 2 gives
dimAG3 = 2
n−1 −
1
n
∑
f |n
φ(f)2n/f + 1.
In the case of n = 3, the dimension turns out to be 22 − 13 (2
3 + 2× 2) + 1 = 1,
so there exists a one-dimensional space of quasi-values symmetric with respect
to cyclic permutations of players.
4.2 Shapley-value as an expected value of non-uniformly distributed
marginal vectors
Suppose that Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n}, i.e. an order is given on the set of player. For
a game v ∈ Γ and a permutation π ∈ Sn, we may define a quasi-value mpi by
(mpi)(v)pi(1) = v(π(1)) and
(mpi(v))pi(i) = v({π(1), π(2), . . . , π(i)})− v({π(1), π(2), . . . , π(i − 1)})
for i = 2, . . . , n. We call mpi the marginal operator and mpi(v) the marginal
vector [2, p. 19]. It corresponds to a situation where the players arrive in the
order π(1), π(2), . . . , π(n) and each player is assigned the value of his or her
contribution to the coalition of all players that have arrived before. The eval-
uation of mpi on a game uR from the unanimity basis is mpi(uR)({π(i)}) =
uR(π(1), . . . , π(i)) − uR(π(1), . . . , π(i − 1)) which is equal to 1 if and only if
π(i) ∈ R and π(j) /∈ R for j > i and 0 otherwise. After the identification 1, we
can represent mpi is as a matrix
(mpi)iR =
{
1 iff i ∈ R and π−1(i) = maxπ−1(R)
0 otherwise.
A theorem of Weber [23] shows that if π is a random permutation taken from a
uniform distribution on Sn then for any game v, the expected value of a marginal
operator mpi is the Shapley value. This can be generalized to the following state-
ment.
Proposition 1. Let G be a subgroup of Sn and A
pi be a probability distributioin
on Sn constant on the right cosets {G · π}pi, i.e. Api = Agpi for all g ∈ G and
π ∈ Sn. Then
∑
Apimpi is a G-symmetric quasi-value.
Proof. We will show that the identity holds if evaluated on games from the
unanimity basis of Γ . For the game uR (Definition 3), we start with the following
equation:
(g ·mpi)(uR) = mg pi(ugR). (6)
To prove this, we evaluate both sides on {i} and rewrite the left-hand side to
the equivalent equation
(mpi(uR))({g
−1(i)}) = (mg pi(ugR))({i}).
Both sides are equal to 1 if and only if π−1(g−1(i)) = maxπ−1(R) and 0 oth-
erwise, which proves (6) for all R ⊆ Ω, i ∈ Ω and g ∈ G. The G-symmetry of∑
pi∈Sn
Apimpi follows from
(
g ·
∑
pi∈Sn
Apimpi
)
(uR) =
∑
pi∈Sn
Api(g ·mpi)(uR) =
∑
pi∈Sn
Apimgpi(ugR) =
=
∑
pi∈Sn
Agpimg pi(ugR) =
∑
g pi=pi′∈Sn
Api
′
mpi′(g · uR) =
(
(
∑
pi′∈Sn
Api
′
mpi′) · g
)
(uR)
where we used (6) in the second and Api = Agpi in the third equality. 
An immediate consequence of the classification Theorem 2 is that for |Ω| > 3
any quasi-value symmetric with respect to the alternating group An is already
the Shapley value. It follows from the last proposition that
∑
pi A
pimpi is the
Shapley value not only for Api = 1n! but also for A
pi = sn! for π even and A
pi = 2−sn!
for π odd, s ∈ [0, 2]. In fact, there are many other possibilities how to express the
Shapley value as a convex combination of marginal operators. The space of all
quasi-values on Ω is (n2n−1 − 2n + 1)-dimensional and the set of all probability
distributions on Sn is a (n! − 1)-dimensional convex region in Rn!, so there are
at least n!− n2n + 2n−1 − 2 degrees of freedom for the choice of a distribution
Api such that
∑
pi A
pimpi = Shapley.
Exponentially many (with respect to n) of these probability distributions Api
can be constructed as follows. Choose Ω0 ⊆ Ω, |Ω0| > 3 and define S0 to be a
group of all permutations π acting identically on Ω \Ω0. Choose α ∈ (0, 2) and
define a probability distribution on Sn by
Api(Ω0) =


1
n! if π /∈ S0
α
n! if π ∈ S0 and π is even
2−α
n! if π ∈ S0 and π is odd
One can verify that the corresponding expected value of marginal operators mpi
is the Shapley value. For a set {Ω1, Ω2, . . . , Ωk} s.t. Ωi * Ωj for all i and j,
the vectors (Api(Ωi)−
1
n! )i ∈ R
n! are linearly independent and the distributions
(Api(Ωi))i are affine independent.
5 Appendix
Here we finish the proof of Theorem 2 by the classification of supertransitive
groups. Our proof is based on a classification of set-transitive permutation groups
given by Beamont and Peterson in 1955 [1]. Another proof of the supertransitive
groups classification was given by Michal Jordan on mathoverflow [13].
Theorem 3. G is a supertransitive subgroup of Sn if and only if one of the
following conditions holds:
– G is the full symmetric group Sn for some n,
– G is the alternating group An for n > 3,
– G is conjugate to the image of an exotic embedding of S5 to S6.
Proof. Let G ⊆ Sn be a group of permutations acting supertransitively on
{1, . . . , n}. This means that the stabilizer of each A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} acts tran-
sitively on A. Let B ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and i, j /∈ B. Then G acts transitively on
B ∪ {i, j} and there exists a permutation π ∈ G taking B ∪ {i} to B ∪ {j} such
that π(i) = j. This implies that for each A and B s.t. |A| = |B| > 1, there exists
a permutation π ∈ G s.t. π(A) = B. If |A| = |B| = 1, the same is true because
supertransitivity implies transitivity. We have shown that if the action of G is
supertransitive, it is also set-transitive.
If G has a supertransitive action on {1, . . . , n}, then its order has to be
divisible by each k ≤ n, because each k-element set A is isomorphic to G/GA,
hence |G| = |A| × |GA|. So, G has to be divisible by the least common multiple
of {1, . . . , n}.
Beamont and Petrson classified all set-transitive permutation groups in [1].
It follows that such subgroups of Sn are exactly the full symmetric group Sn for
any n, the alternating group An for n > 2 and 5 exceptions. The first and second
exceptions are subgroups of S5 of order 10, resp. 20. These groups cannot have
a supertransitive action on {1, . . . , 5}, because the lowest common multiple of
{1, . . . , 5} is 60. Two other exceptions in Beamont’s classification are subgroups
of S9 of orders 504 and 1512. These numbers are not divisible by the lowest com-
mon multiple of {1, . . . , 9} so we can exclude them as well. The last exception is
a subgroup of S6 of order 120. This groups is equivalent to the exotic embedding
of S5 to S6 and we will show that it acts supertransitively on S6.
In [12], the authors realize this group action on {1, . . . , 6} as the conjugate
action of S5 on its six Sylow 5-subgroups. Using this realisation, we may show
that this action is supertransitive by direct calculation. Let as denote the Sylow
5-subgroups by I = 〈(12345)〉, II = 〈(12354)〉, III = 〈(12435)〉, IV = 〈(12453)〉,
V = 〈(12534))〉 and V I = 〈(12543)〉. An elementary calculation shows that the
image of a transposition in S5 is the product of three disjoint transpositions in
S6, e.g. (1, 2) ∈ S5 7→ (I, V I) (II, IV )(III, V ) in the above realisation. Together
with the set-transitivity of this S5-action, this implies 2-supertransitivity. The
image of a 3-cycle in S5 is a product of two disjoint 3-cycles in S6, which implies
3-supertransitivity. Similarly, the image of a 4-, resp. 5-cycle in S5 is a 4-, resp.
5-cycle in S6, which implies 4- and 5-supertransitivity.
It remains to prove that An is supertransitive if and only if n > 3. First note
that A2 = {id}, reps. A3 = 〈(123)〉 are not supertransitive, because no element
of these groups takes 1 to 2 and preserves {1, 2}. Let n > 3 and A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
be a k-set. If k < n − 1, then any permutation of A can be extended to an
even permutation of {1, . . . , n}. If k = n − 1 > 2, then for each i, j ∈ A, there
exists an even permutation of A taking i to j. This can be extended to an even
permutation of {1, . . . , n}, acting identically on the complement of A. 
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